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I . 
NASA 712, CONVAIR 990, N712NA 
MARCH A I R  FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 
July 17, 1985 
Nat iona l  Aeronautics and Space Admin is t ra t ion  
Washlngton, D.C. 20546 
SYNOPSIS 
On Ju ly  17, 1985, a t  1810 P.d.t., NASA 712, a Convair 990 a i r c r a f t ,  was 
destroyed by f i r e  a t  March A i r  Force Base, C a l i f o r n i a .  
t he  r o l l o u t  a f t e r  t he  p i l o t  re jec ted  the  takeof f  on runway 32. The re jec ted  
takeoff-s i n i t i a t e d  dur ing  the takeof f  r o l l  because o f  blown t i r e s  on the  
r i g h t  main landing gear. During the r o l l o u t ,  fragments o f  e i t h e r  the  blown 
t i r e s  or  t he  wheel/brake assemblies penetrated a r igh t -w ing  f u e l  tank forward 
of the  r i g h t  main land ing  gear. Leaking f u e l  i g n i t e d  w h i l e  t h e  a i r c r a f t  was 
r o l l i n g ,  and f i r e  engul fed the  r i g h t  wing and the  fuselage a f t e r  t he  a i r c r a f t  
was stopped on the  runway. The 4-man f l i g h t c r e w  and t h e  15 s c i e n t i s t s  and 
technic ians seated I n  t h e  cabin evacuated the  a i r c r a f t  w i thou t  ser ious i n j u r y .  
The f i r e  was no t  ext inguished by crash/f i re/rescue e f f o r t s  and the  a i r c r a f t  
was destroyed. 
The f i r e  s t a r t e d  du r ing  
F INDINGS 
1. The crewmembers were proper ly  c e r t i f i e d  and q u a l i f i e d  f o r  the  f l i g h t  
I n  accordance w i t h  NASA Ames Research Center (ARC)  p o l l c i e s .  
2. The a i r c r a f t  commander was occupying the  r i g h t  seat and performing 
c o p i l o t  du t ies  f o r  t h i s  f l i g h t .  The assigned p i l o t  was seated i n  the  l e f t  
seat making the  takeo f f .  
3.  The a l r c r a f t  was operated as a p u b l i c  a i r c r a f t  and was maintained i n  
accordance wi th  Convalr 990 maintenance manuals and ARC procedures. Modif i ca-  
t i o n s  t o  the a i r c r a f t  had been made and approved I n  accordance w i th  ARC a l r -  
worthiness requirements. 
4. The a c t i v e  runway f o r  landing and takeo f f  a t  March Air Force Base 
(AFB), runway 32, i s  300 f e e t  wide by 13,300 f e e t  long. 
5 .  The runway was d ry  and the ou ts ide  temperature was 85 O F .  
6. The t a x i  d is tance from NASA 712's parked p o s i t i o n  on the  ramp t o  the  
depar ture end o f  runway 32 was 2.4 mi les.  Average t a x i  speed was about 25 
knots.  
7. The f l i g h t c r e w  completed the before-takeof f check l i s t ,  es tab l i shed 
t a k e o f f  t h rus t ,  and began the  takeof f  a t  approximately 1,000 f e e t  from the  
t a k e o f f  end o f  runway 32. 
8. The March A F B  c o n t r o l  tower requested t h a t  N A S A  712 swi tch t o  
9. The cockpi t  crew was no t  mon i to r ing  March A F B  c o n t r o l  tower o r  emer- 
departure cont ro l  frequency be fore  takeo f f .  
gency frequencies du r ing  the  takeof f .  
10. The p i l o t ,  a f t e r  hear ing two r a p i d  explos ive bangs and assoc ia t ing  
them wi th  a blown t i r e ,  re jec ted  the  takeo f f .  
deployed the  spoi lers,  and se lected reverse t h r u s t  on a l l  engines. 
t h r u s t  was appl ied about 14 seconds a f t e r  t he  p i l o t  heard the f i r s t  exp los lve 
bang. 
He reduced t h r u s t  t o  I d l e ,  
Reverse 
11. The p i l o t  s ta ted  t h a t  he decided t o  use l i g h t  b rak ing  i n  view o f  the  
remaining runway, the  suspected blown t i r e  o r  t i r e s ,  and h i s  concern w i th  keep- 
i n g  the  a i r c r a f t  a l igned on the  cen te r l i ne .  
p i l o t ,  do no t  d i r e c t l y  address re jec ted  takeof fs  w i t h  blown t i r e s  b u t  do s t a t e  
t h a t  b rak ing  should be used i n  r e j e c t i n g  a takeo f f .  
The a i r c r a f t  comnander ( c o p i l o t )  d i d  no t  ho ld  the  c o n t r o l  yoke 
forward dur ing  the r o l l o u t .  
wheel reduced nose wheel s tee r ing  ef fect iveness.  
systems were normal before the  takeo f f  was re jec ted .  
12. The procedures o u t l i n e d  i n  the  ARC f l i g h t  manuals, a v a i l a b l e  t o  the  
13. 
The r e s u l t i n g  l i g h t  corner ing  forces on the  nose 
14. The main gear t i r e s  had been proper ly  i n f l a t e d ,  and the  brake 
15. The f i r s t  t i r e  anomaly was f a i l u r e  o f  t he  cas ing on t i r e  3. The 
f i r s t  pieces of casing were found on the  runway a t  about 1,400 fee t .  
cass blew a t  4,138 fee t ,  imnediate ly  a f t e r  t i r e  4 f a i l e d .  
4,125 f e e t  from over loading and heat ing.  
The car-  
T l r e  4 f a i l e d  a t  
16. A t h l r d  t i r e ,  a t  t he  no. 8 pos i t i on ,  f a i l e d  a t  6,190 fee t ,  2,065 f e e t  
a f t e r  t i r e  4 fa i l ed .  
wheel. debr is .  
T i r e  8 f a i l e d  e i t h e r  from over loading o r  damage f rom 
17. A four th  t i r e ,  a t  t he  no. 7 pos i t i on ,  f a i l e d  a t  7,300 fee t ,  
3,175 f e e t  a f t e r  t i r e  4 f a i l e d ,  a l so  from over loading o r  damage from wheel 
debr is  . 
18. T i res 3, 4, and 7 were 12 years o ld .  T l r e  8 was 9 years o ld .  T i res  
3 and 7 were 24-ply ra ted  and t i r e s  4 and 8 were 22-ply ra ted.  
i t s  s i x t h  retread, t i r e s  4 and 7 on t h e i r  f o u r t h  re t reads,  and t i r e  8 on I t s  
second ret read.  
T i r e  3 was on 
19. A r ight-wing f u e l  tank was penetrated, most l i k e l y  between 6,000 and 
7,000 f e e t  down the runway, by an unknown ob jec t .  Outside witnesses s ta ted  
t h a t  they saw f i r e  on the  a i r c r a f t  a t  about 7,000 fee t ,  c o i n c i d i n g  w i th  the  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  reverse t h r u s t .  
were a t  11,950 feet .  
The f i r s t  s igns o f  f i r e  on the  runway surface 
. 
20. The a i r c r a f t  was stopped a t  12,660 fee t ,  640 f e e t  f rom the  end o f  
t he  runway and about 30 f e e t  t o  the  r i g h t  o f  c e n t e r l i n e .  
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21. The forward and a f t  l e f t - s ide  a i r c r a f t  e x i t s  were opened, and the  
s l i d e s  were used by a l l  Occupants t o  success fu l l y  evacuate the  a i r c r a f t  i n  a 
t ime ly  manner. 
22. The c o n t r o l  tower operator completed n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  the  f i r e  depart-  
ment's alarm room operator ( a  r e l i e f  operator was on duty)  on the  pr imary crash 
network a t  1810:28. The primary crash network was secured a t  1810:51, and the  
alarm room operator responded t o  the secondary crash network a t  1810:55. 
secured the  secondary crash network telephone and simultaneously a l e r t e d  crash/ 
f i r e h e s c u e  personnel i n  the  f i r e  s t a t i o n  a t  1811:50. 
b 
He 
*' 
23. The r e l i e f  a larm room operator had n e i t h e r  experience i n  an emergency 
s i t u a t i o n  nor hands-on t r a i n i n g .  
CFR veh ic le  (a  P-15 t ruck ) .  
H i s  pr imary du ty  was as d r i v e r  o f  a major 
24. There was an avoidable delay o f  1 minute and 22 seconds i n  dispatch- 
25. The f i r s t  c rash/ f i re / rescue veh ic le  had t raversed the  1.6 m i les  t o  
i n g  f i r e  equipment. 
the  acc ident  s i t e  and was engaged i n  f i r e f i g h t i n g  a t  1814:24, 3 minutes and 56 
seconds a f t e r  n o t i f i c a t i o n .  
26. Dur ing the f i r e f i g h t i n g  e f f o r t ,  1,915 ga l lons  o f  aqueous f i lm- fo rming  
foam and 59,000 ga l lons  o f  water were expended. 
wing f u e l  supply was exhausted. 
The f i r e  abated as the  r l g h t -  
27. A i r c r a f t  acc ident / inc ident  s t a t i s t i c s  I n d i c a t e  t h a t  more re jec ted  
takeo f f s  a re  due t o  t i r e  f a i l u r e s  than t o  engine f a i l u r e s .  
2'8. 
the  a n t i s k i d  brake system even though i t  was no t  determined t o  be a f a c t o r  i n  
t h i s  acc ident .  The CV-990 a n t i s k i d  brake system has pressure c o n t r o l  charac- 
t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  p i l o t s  should be aware o f  when brak ing  w i t h  f a i l e d  t i r e s .  
The Board along w i t h  Hydro-Aire engineers looked a t  t he  operat ion o f  
PROBABLE CAUSE 
The NASA A i r c r a f t  Accident I nves t i ga t i on  Board determined t h a t  the  prob- 
ab le cause o f  the  acc ident  was the near ly  simultaneous f a i l u r e  o f  the two f r o n t  
t i r e s  on the r i g h t  main landing gear a t  a c r i t i c a l  t ime du r ing  the takeo f f  
r o l l .  These f a i l u r e s  resu l ted  i n  the p i l o t ' s  dec is ion  t o  r e j e c t  the takeo f f .  
Con t r i bu t i ng  t o  the  seve r i t y  o f  the  acc ident  was an in tense f i r e  fed by leakage 
from the  puncture o f  a r i gh t -w ing  f u e l  tank forward o f  the  r i g h t  main gear; 
t he  puncture occurred dur ing the i n t e n t i o n a l  extended r o l l o u t  o f  the  a i r c r a f t .  
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a r e s u l t  of i t s  i nves t i ga t i on  o f  t he  Convair 990, NASA 712, acc ident  o f  
Ju l y  17, 1985, and a review o f  pe r t l nen t  background documents and repor ts ,  the  
NASA A i r c r a f t  Accident I nves t i ga t i on  Board makes the  f o l l o w i n g  recommendations. 
Federal Av ia t ion  Admin is t ra t ion  
in fo rmat ion  on procedures f o r  t akeo f f  emergencies o ther  than engine f a i l u r e .  
This In format ion should inc lude guidance f o r  con t inu ing  versus r e j e c t i n g  take- 
o f f  when an a i r c r a f t  w i th  a l l  engines opera t ing  normal ly  develops anomalies a t  
h igh  speed before reaching VI, t he  speed a t  which a takeo f f  dec i s ion  must 
be made. Factors such as d i r e c t i o n a l  con t ro l ,  t i r e  f a i l u r e s ,  wheel r i m  f a i l -  
ures, a n t i s k i d  brak ing cha rac te r i s t i cs ,  brake l i n e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  and f u e l  
tank and s t r u c t u r a l  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  pene t ra t i on  could be considered. Hazard 
analyses and r i s k  assessments f o r  var ious scenarios could be discussed t o  pro- 
v ide  background in fo rmat ion  f o r  f l i gh tc rews  t o  enhance t h e i r  decision-making 
du r ing  takeo f f  emergencies. 
1. Require t h a t  f l i g h t  manuals f o r  l a r g e  mul t ieng ine  a i r c r a f t  p rov ide  
2.  Require t h a t  f l i g h t  manuals f o r  l a r g e  a i r c r a f t  spec i fy  re jec ted-  
takeo f f  procedures i n v o l v i n g  t i r e  f a i l u r e s  and prov ide  guidance on s topping 
procedures. Control  yoke management procedures t o  enhance d i r e c t i o n a l  con t ro l ,  
s i m i l a r  t o  guidance provided f o r  t akeo f f s  and landings, should be addressed. 
3.  Sponsor a j o i n t  research e f f o r t  w i th  o ther  appropr ia te  Government 
agencies t o  improve f i r e f i g h t i n g  c a p a b i l i t i e s  f o r  running- fue l  " th ree  
dimensional' f i r e s .  
4. Continue t o  research the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  var ious a v i a t i o n  f i r e -  
f i g h t i n g  agents i n  order t o  i d e n t i f y  t he  most e f f e c t i v e  agents and t o  e s t a b l i s h  
a n a t i o n a l  standard f o r  a v i a t i o n  f i r e f i g h t i n g  agents. 
5. Provide a d d i t i o n a l  emphasis t o  enhance compliance w i th  the  design 
c r i t e r i a  f o r  a i r c r a f t  s t ruc tu res  and systems so as t o  l oca te  f u e l  tank and 
o ther  ' c r i t i c a l  Inspec t ion  p la tes  on sur face areas t h a t  a re  n o t  vu lnerable t o  
deb r i s  f rom f a i l e d  t i r e s ,  wheels, and brake assemblies. 
6. Require t h a t  manufacturers review the  a n t i s k i d  b rak ing  system char- 
a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  l a rge  mul t ieng ine  a i r c r a f t ,  w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  mul- 
t i p l e . t l r e  o r  wheel f a i l u r e s  and t h e i r  e f f e c t  on system operat ion and o v e r a l l  
b rak ing  ef fect iveness.  Each manufacturer should p rov ide  operators w i t h  an 
ana lys is  o f  the r e s u l t s  o f  such reviews and suggested procedures f o r  p i l o t  
response t o  t i re /wheel  f a i l u r e s .  
7.  Review and amend, as necessary, t he  c r i t e r i a  es tab l i shed f o r  t he  
number o f  t i r e  re t reads permi t ted on a s i n g l e  carcass and f o r  t he  removal o f  
t i r e s  f rom serv ice due t o  age o r  number o f  cyc les.  
8. Encourage grea ter  use o f  s t ronger  wheels w i t h  r o l l - o n - r i m  c a p a b i l i t y  
f o r  t ranspor t  category a i r c r a f t  c e r t i f i e d  s ince  1979. 
9. 
t r a i n i n g  programs t h a t  adequately address t i r e ,  wheel, aad brake problems dur-  
i n g  takeo f f .  
t h a t  p rov ide  r e a l i s t i c  t r a i n i n g  i n  the  recogn i t i on  and handl ing o f  such 
problems. 
Review and modify cur ren t  f l i g h t c r e w  requirements t o  i nc lude  t ime ly  
Motion-based s imulators  used i n  the  program should have models 
10. Review and amend, as necessary, t h e  design c r i t e r i a  f o r  l a r g e  a i r -  
c r a f t  wheels and t i r e s  t o  preclude sympathetic t i r e  f a i l u r e s  occu r r i ng  a f t e r  
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. 
an i n i t i a l  s i n g l e  t i r e  f a i l u r e .  Considerations should inc lude heavyweight 
takeof fs  and landings. 
11. A l e r t  CV-990 operators o f  p o t e n t i a l  a n t i s k i d  f a i l u r e  modes t h a t  can 
Determine I f  any a n t i s k i d  r e s u l t  from loss  of two t i r e s  on the same ax le.  
system wi th  s i m i l a r  l o g i c  i s  operable on o ther  U.S. a i r c r a f t  and issue an 
a l e r t .  
Department o f  Defense 
1. Review and modify a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  procedures so t h a t  a l l  m i l i t a r y  
a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  towers comply w i th  the  prov ls lons  o f  Chapter 3 ,  Sect ion 9, 
Departure Contro l  I ns t ruc t i ons ,  FAA A i r  T r a f f i c  Contro l  Manual 7110.65. 
2. Review cur ren t  p r a c t i c e  t o  ensure t h a t  crash/ f l re / rescue procedures 
f o r  alarm room operators inc lude immediate a l e r t l n g  o f  f i r e f i g h t i n g  personnel 
i n  response t o  an unannounced emergency. 
3 .  Require t h a t  f i r e f i g h t e r s  assigned t o  c r i t i c a l  pos i t i ons  be precluded 
4. Ensure t h a t  a l l  c rash/ f i re / rescue alarm room operators rece ive  
from r e l i e f  operator assignment. 
hands-on t r a i n i n g .  
NASA Headquarters 
1. Sponsor a study w i th  indust ry  t o  assess the  hazards from blown t i r e s  
on heavy a i r c r a f t .  The study should consider the  fo l l ow ing :  
a. S u s c e p t i b i l i t y  o f  a i r c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  and systems t o  damage 
b. Maximum brak ing  versus l i m i t e d  brak ing  
c .  Anomalies o f  a n t i s k i d  brake systems 
d. Cont inuing versus r e j e c t i n g  takeo f f  
2. Evaluate and develop the  requirement f o r  f l i gh tc rews  o f  l a r g e  NASA 
a i r c r a f t  t o  rece ive  t r a i n i n g  I n  FAA Phase I1 or  Phase 111 s imulators  capable 
o f  p resent ing  r e a l i s t i c  f a i l e d - t i r e  models. 
3 .  Evaluate and e s t a b l i s h  a requirement f o r  incorpora t ion  o f  cockp i t  
resource management t r a i n i n g  i n t o  NASA f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  programs f o r  mul t ic rew- 
member a i r c r a f t .  
4. Es tab l i sh  gu ide l ines  requ i r i ng  t h a t  on ly  new t i r e s  o r  re t reads o f  
NASA t i r e s  be used on NASA a i r c r a f t .  
5 .  Develop NASA c r i t e r i a  f o r  the number of t i r e  re t reads permi t ted on a 
s i n g l e  carcass and f o r  t he  removal o f  t i r e s  from se rv i ce  because o f  age o r  
number o f  cyc les.  
6. Es tab l i sh  gu ide l ines  requ i r i ng  t h a t  a l l  occupants o f  NASA a i r c r a f t  on 
research missions wear f l i g h t  s u i t s  made from appropr ia te  f i r e - r e t a r d a n t  
ma te r ia l s .  
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7. Establish a policy to ensure that original designs and manufacturers' 
blueprints, drawings, etc., of unique equipment onboard NASA aircraft durlng 
research missions be retained at appropriate ground facilitles. The only 
existing copies of such materials should not be carried onboard NASA aircraft. 
NASA Aircraft ODerations Managers 
1. Establish procedures for rejected takeoffs that parallel accepted alr 
carrier industry practices, with emphasis on the use of maximum wheel braking 
and control yoke management. 
on appropriate NASA aircraft and, if feasible, Implement their use. 
2.  Review the practicality of using wheels with roll-on-rim capability 
3. Review the current status of, and need for, structural and cabin flre 
protection systems on NASA aircraft and, where appropriate, update those 
systems to incorporate modern detection and suppression devices. 
4. Develop guidelines to minimize the use of tires with different ply 
ratings or tires produced by different manufacturers on the same axle where 
differences in characteristics between such tires can affect tire loading under 
normal operating conditions (see National Transportation Safety Board Recom- 
mendation A-78-71, addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration, dated 
9/6/78). 
5. Ensure that copies of pertinent aircraft operational and maintenance 
6'. 
logs are retained at appropriate ground facilities. 
pressures. 
Ensure that preflight inspection records contain the measured tire 
7. Require that all NASA flightcrews monitor the controlling facility 
radio frequency or appropriate emergency frequency during takeoff . 
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On Ju ly  17, 1985, a t  1810 P.d.t., NASA 712, a Convair 990 a i r c r a f t ,  was destroyed 
by f i r e  a t  March A i r  Force Base, C a l i f o r n i a .  The f i r e  s t a r t e d  du r ing  the  r o l l o u t  
a f t e r  t he  p i l o t  re jec ted  the takeo f f  on runway 32. The re jec ted  takeo f f  was 
I n i t i a t e d  dur ing  the takeo f f  r o l l  because o f  blown t i r e s  on the  r i g h t  main land- 
i n g  gear. During t h e  r o l l o u t ,  fragments o f  e i t h e r  the  blown t i r e s  o r  t he  wheel/ 
brake assemblies penetrated a r igh t -w ing  f u e l  tank forward o f  t h e  r i g h t  main 
land lng  gear. Leaking f u e l  i g n i t e d  wh i l e  the  a i r c r a f t  was r o l l i n g ,  and f i r e  
engul fed t h e  r i g h t  wing and the  fuselage a f t e r  t he  a i r c r a f t  was stopped on the  
runway. 
the  cabin evacuated the  a i r c r a f t  w i thout  ser ious i n j u r y .  The f i r e  was n o t  
ext inguished by crash/ f i re / rescue e f f o r t s  and t h e  a i r c r a f t  was destroyed. 
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